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Abstract 
In recent years, short-term home rental companies such as Airbnb and Vacation Rentals 
by Owner (VRBO) have grown in popularity throughout the United States and the world. The 
lack of regulation of this rapid growth, which stemmed from the legal grey area these rentals fall 
under, caused some states to adopt specific regulatory policies. These regulatory policies attempt 
to better monitor this sector, to tax rental earnings, and to reduce perceived negative externalities 
to this new market. This thesis researches the benefits and costs that short-term rentals (STRs) 
provide to cities and the regulatory implications on the growing rental market. Using census data 
along with a STR regulatory index developed by the R Street Institute that measure city-level 
regulations, this paper presents evidence that city-level regulations of STRs were largely 
unpredictable. Although no widespread common factors explain regulatory decisions, local sales 
tax rates, residents’ political policy preferences, city population age, and owner-occupied median 
home values were found to have some influence in explaining variations among cities in short-
term rental regulation. 
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I - Introduction 
The sharing economy has become increasingly popular over the last decade, with 
prominent examples in the short-term home rental markets and transportation service provider 
markets. Companies such as Airbnb, VRBO, Uber, Lyft, and Bird have contributed greatly to 
this rapid growth. As these markets continue to gain traction globally, PWC forecasts that the 
sharing economy will grow to $335 billion by 2025 (PWC, 2014). This rapid expansion has 
influenced cities across the United States to take diverse stances on how to best regulate STRs—
with regulatory policies varying considerably across cities. The purpose of this paper is to 
explain whether or not cities that regulate the STR market share similarities that might help 
predict or categorize how cities outside of our sample of 35 cities will respond to STRs. These 
city-level regulatory legislations of the short-term rental market are unsystematically 
implemented among some of the largest cities in the U.S., with local tax rates, resident political 
preferences, median age, and owner-occupied median home values only capturing some of this 
variability. 
 The growth of the STR market has relied on the expansion of online communities of 
people that demand and supply goods and services in the sharing economy. Web-based platforms 
allow owners of idle assets to generate revenue from consumers looking to use these assets 
without directly owning them. Widespread smartphone and laptop usage has greatly eased the 
difficulties previously associated with connecting asset owners to potential consumers. These 
online platforms provide greater availability and access to otherwise underused assets or 
services, such as a vacant room in someone’s home (Kenton, 2019). 
 One major sector within the sharing economy, the short-term rental market, has shown 
considerable growth in recent years. Primarily recognized through the popularity of Airbnb, 
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STRs describe rental periods lasting less than 30 days (DiNatale et al., 2018). Airbnb classifies 
itself as “a trusted community marketplace for people to list, discover, and book unique 
accommodations around the world - online or from a mobile phone” (Airbnb, 2019). More 
specifically, Airbnb specializes in connecting homeowners with short-term renters through its 
online platform to provide owners with additional income and renters with affordable places to 
stay. Within this market, there exists a wide range of rental options, from entire homes, 
condominiums, and apartments to single rooms, with over one million current listings worldwide 
(Airbnb, 2019). This unique and growing market continues to contribute to the sharing economy, 
making it an important, relevant, and evolving area for research. 
 Our motivation for researching this project stems from personal experiences. We have 
encountered several externalities in our own neighborhoods when homeowners market their 
extra rooms or whole homes for nightly rentals. Although many cities and neighborhood 
associations impose strict limitations on short-term rentals, these operations are often difficult to 
identify and time consuming for neighbors to report. As residents of Virginia Beach, we have 
seen many visiting Airbnb guests use Ubers or Lyfts as their mode of transportation. The 
increase in Uber traffic in our neighborhoods created potentially dangerous situations, as Uber 
drivers, unfamiliar with speed limits and the layout of the neighborhood, often drove quickly past 
playing children. Additionally, our families feared that the close proximity of short-term rentals 
would decrease the values of their homes. These experiences sparked our curiosity regarding the 
home-sharing market and also added a level of personal investment in this thesis. 
This thesis begins with observing the costs and benefits of the STR market, followed by 
observing R Street’s Roomscore report, and concludes with statistical analysis aimed at 
supplementing and explaining R Street’s regulatory scores for cities.   
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II - Benefits and Costs of STRs 
The short-term rental market includes rental agreements of residential rooms, apartments, 
condominiums, and entire homes, rentals with durations less than 30 days. Anyone with extra 
living space has the opportunity to list the space for rent on one of the numerous STR websites. 
These individuals can post their listings on websites such as Airbnb, VRBO, HomeAway, and 
even Craigslist. Demand for these listings stems from individuals who need or desire a place to 
stay for a short period of time, and these listing platforms connect the suppliers and consumers. 
This market introduces competition to the hotel industry, which has long operated under strict 
regulations with costly taxes and permits.   
The sharing economy contributes materially to cities around the United States. As the 
number of homeowners who list their homes or individual rooms for rent on Airbnb and similar 
websites increases, competition in the overall short-term lodging market also increases. These 
new rentals often cost less than traditional hotel rooms and thus force many hotel companies to 
lower their own prices in order to maintain their rental occupancy rates. These lower prices 
expand the availability of affordable housing for vacationers and other short-term travelers in 
many cities, giving lower income individuals and families more selections and better access to 
vacationing options (Zervas et al., 2014). With lower short-term rental costs, more people 
become more willing and able to travel and vacation. According to Airbnb’s own research and 
data collection, customers that utilize its website to book vacations instead of a more traditional 
booking service take, on average, 2.1 times longer vacations. Additionally, 31 percent of Airbnb 
guests report that they would have either not traveled or would have reduced their trip length if 
they could not use Airbnb to rent their rooms. While on vacation, they spend money and support 
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local economies with additional tourism revenue not available to cities prior to this sharing 
service (Airbnb, 2015). 
In addition, renters can often find available rooms through home-sharing rentals when 
they cannot reserve rooms from hotels and other traditional short-term rentals. Those who travel 
to experience a different culture or to engage in social interactions outside of popular tourist 
destinations can do so more easily with the diverse rental locations Airbnb has to offer. Other 
evidence supports the claim that vacationers choose to rent through a home-sharing service 
because they prefer the larger rooms and full amenities of staying in a house rather than a hotel 
(Guttentag et al., 2017). 
Hosts also benefit from listing their homes or additional rooms on these sharing sites. The 
hosts using Airbnb for an average of 66 days a year make, on average, an additional $7,530 per 
year from rental income on a single property. This additional income significantly helps middle 
class homeowners who have an additional room they can rent relatively easily (Sperling, 2014). 
With the additional income potential as a result of these short-term home-sharing economies, 
housing prices seem to rise as a result, giving homeowners more equity in their homes. This 
improves their balance sheets and gives them more economic freedom (Sheppard & Udell, 
2016).  Additionally, a decrease in long-term rental supply increases housing prices. An increase 
in short-term rental supply causes a decrease in long-term rental supply coupled with the 
potential for additional income. Given that the number of Airbnb listings has doubled (on 
average since inception), a 100 percent increase in Airbnb listings was associated with a 1.8 
percent annual increase in rent costs and a 2.6 percent annual increase in housing prices (Barron 
et al., 2020).  
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Although many beneficial impacts come as a result of Airbnb’s presence in a locality, 
there are negative consequences. While many individuals may benefit from the additional 
revenue streams provided from Airbnb rentals, close to 40 percent of Airbnb’s revenue stems 
from another source: landlords known as “super hosts” that list and operate large numbers of 
Airbnb rentals (Pickell, 2016). “Super hosts” weaken the argument that only owner-occupants 
utilize the short-term rental market to help pay their mortgages by identifying individuals with 
multiple simultaneous Airbnb listings. Although the short-term rental market offers benefits to 
middle class homeowners that choose to rent out extra rooms and the large “super hosts,” hotels 
have experienced drastic decreases in revenue growth rates since Airbnb’s inception (Pickell, 
2016). 
Additionally, since many cities have not yet established definite Airbnb regulations, hosts 
can easily undercut higher hotel prices due to the high tax rates imposed on hotels. Hotels pass 
some of this tax burden onto consumers, which increases hotel room prices relative to home-
sharing services that do not face these taxes. As a result of less expensive STRs, many cities 
have lost significant amounts of hotel tax revenue due to limited or nonexistent taxes on short-
term rental transactions (Zervas et al., 2016).  
The rapid growth of short-term rental listings has significantly increased the supply of 
accommodations, and consequently the overall lodging industry has become more competitive. 
As a result of these changes, hotels have been unable to maintain their long-enjoyed benefits of 
lodging price dominance. Prior to the introduction of rental platforms such as Airbnb, hotels had 
total control over the fixed supply of rooms available for nightly rentals, and they would set 
rental rates based on the level of demand and existing occupancy rates (Dogru, et al., 2018). Not 
only have STRs increased this supply, but these platforms also easily adjust their number of 
   
 
 6 
listings in response to fluctuations in demand and strip hotels of much of their prior price-
controlling power (Farronato & Fradkin, 2018).  
Farronato and Fradkin (2018) measured the effects of Airbnb’s market share on hotel 
industries across 50 U.S. cities in 2014. They estimated that Airbnb’s presence in the 
accommodations industry caused an aggregate reduction in hotel profits across all 50 cities by up 
to 3.7 percent. In addition, this effect was concentrated in densely populated cities with large 
numbers of Airbnb listings during the busiest holidays. In these circumstances, hotels are 
constrained by the physical number of rooms they have, and their occupancy rates along with 
rental prices increase in response to this high demand situation. When homeowners or 
condominium owners with unused rooms observe these high prices, many of them begin listing 
room availabilities on the Airbnb platform. This increase in the supply of lodging due to Airbnb 
drives prices back down, and hotels miss out on much of the earnings that would have been 
realized if Airbnb listings had not become available (Farronato & Fradkin, 2018). 
A similar study also published in 2018 determined the time series effects of Airbnb on 
the hotel industries in 10 U.S. cities from 2008 to 2014. This research estimated that each 1 
percent increase in the number of Airbnb listings caused the average revenue per hotel room to 
decrease by 0.02 percent from 2008 to 2017. On the surface, this estimate seems to account for 
only a small effect, but considering that the number of Airbnb listings has doubled each year (on 
average since inception), the total effect is large. If this trend continues over the next year, hotel 
revenues are expected to fall by 2 percent in the next 12 (Dogru, et al., 2018). 
Another negative impact stemming from the rise of Airbnb relates to the increases in 
long-term home ownership and rent, which have contributed to an affordability crisis, as people 
now spend a larger percentage of their income on their personal mortgages or long-term rental 
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services. The long-term rental market consists of rentals over 30 days which is typically seen in 
monthly and annual rentals. The increase in STRs also places potential homeowners in a difficult 
position due to rising house prices, and Airbnb has made this affordability crisis even more 
severe by lowering the supply of long-term rental properties or properties for sale. An increase in 
the supply of short-term rentals has decreased the supply of long-term rentals and mortgages—
since homeowners are now willing to rent their properties in the STR market instead of renting 
their asset long-term or selling their property, making house prices increase. Consequently, 
homeowners and long-term renters now have to spend a greater portion of their salaries or 
incomes on houses (Ward, 2017). In San Francisco, for example, “residents can expect to spend 
40.6 percent of their income on a monthly mortgage payment, or 47 percent on rent” (Lee, 2016). 
The U.S. Census Bureau identifies anything greater than 30 percent of an individual’s income on 
housing as “housing-cost burden” (Schwartz & Wilson, 2006). This significant amount of 
income dedicated solely to rent and mortgage payments creates an area of concern for 
homeowners and long-term renters. 
The effects of the short-term rental market raising long-term rental prices and home 
prices have also raised the concern of possible gentrification. Some analysts argue that Airbnb 
benefits wealthy white commercial homeowners who purchase housing to rent out in 
predominantly black and Hispanic neighborhoods, which makes these houses unaffordable for 
many people in the area (Bernardi, 2018). In New York City, for example, 23,200 new housing 
units were completed in 2016. This supply growth, however, was significantly offset by the 
12,200 entire-home Airbnb listings in 2016. Over 52 percent of the increase in NYC housing 
supply in 2016 may have been canceled out these short-term rentals (Wachsmuth & Weisler, 
2018). Wachsmuth and Weisler (2018) argue this has perpetuated the process of gentrification by 
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leading to even greater income inequality and taking away many housing opportunities for lower 
income families. 
Many of the negative impacts of short-term home rental services involve market 
externalities. For instance, home-sharing guests can inadvertently inconvenience full-time 
residents by taking parking spots and stopping them during their daily commute to ask for 
directions (Edelman & Geradin, 2015). In Los Angeles, for example “these hotel-like room 
rentals are unpopular with neighbors in residential neighborhoods as they bring transients, traffic, 
create potential safety issues and could negatively impact surrounding property values” (The 
Eastsider, 2013). Often, home-sharing guests decide that, as only part-time visitors in a particular 
area, they have little accountability to care for their surrounding environment (Edelman & 
Geradin, 2015). This lack of concern can lead to environmental damages, unsafe environments 
for surrounding citizens, and potential damage to properties.  
Externalities in the short-term home-sharing rental market make designing and 
implementing effective regulatory policies more difficult. Many cities in the United States have 
adopted legislation to restrict the usage and prevalence of Airbnb rentals. San Francisco, for 
example, adopted a policy that allows only permanent residents to use these markets, and these 
owners can only rent for ninety days out of the year. These hosts also must obtain certifications 
to operate within Airbnb’s network. If a host breaks this law, they must pay a fine which 
increases with additional offenses. The most effective regulatory policies currently appear to 
target the hosts, rather than the renters (Espinosa, 2016). 
Both special interest groups and public interest have played a role in local governments’ 
decision-making processes regarding the STR market. Influence exists from both special interest 
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groups and public interest—which helps explain the divergence in regulation among cities across 
the United States.  
Short-term rental platforms and the hotel industry primarily drive the two special interest 
groups competing to gain market-share in the lodging industry. In order to combat increased 
scrutiny and attacks from hotels, STR rental companies such as Airbnb have lobbied to fight 
against “new regulations or seeking compromises that allow the company to continue operating” 
(Kirkham & Bensinger, 2017). Airbnb has done this a few different ways. In the past, they have 
helped fund the Checks and Balances Project which is a “public watchdog blog” that attacks the 
hotel industry through lobbying and campaign expenditures (Kirkham, 2017). In addition to 
helping fund the Checks and Balances Project, Airbnb has taken a targeted lobbying approach of 
focusing on major cities that are considering potential regulations. For example, in 2017, Airbnb 
spent close to $1.9 million lobbying in Los Angeles in an attempt to keep that market intact—
which proved unsuccessful. Conversely, Airbnb successfully outspent opponents 16 to one in 
San Francisco in 2015 and avoided legislation that would have significantly limited their 
operating capacity in the city. Trying to convince local governments to minimally regulate the 
STR market, Airbnb and similar companies have dedicated meaningful resources to special 
interest lobbying (Kirkham, 2017). 
In an attempt to increase regulations on their competition, the hotel industry spends time, 
money, and resources lobbying against the STR market as a special interest group.  During the 
2016 election cycle, HotelPAC, the lobbying committee of the hotel industry, fundraised a record 
$1.5 million to support selected candidates (Breland, 2017). The American Hotel and Lodging 
Association, which oversees HotelPAC, stated that “the money boosted candidates who back the 
industry and were potentially in favor of having Airbnb ‘play by the same rules’” (Breland, 
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2017). Specifically, they mentioned that their goal was to protect the lodging industry and 
communities from commercial “super hosts” that use Airbnb to run illegal businesses in 
residential areas. With Airbnb spending significant resources on lobbying, the hotel industry has 
decided to fight back. The two competing sides of these special interest groups have experienced 
both failures and successes—as policymakers are fairly split, which helps further explain the 
variations in regulation. 
In addition to the special interest groups, public interest has also remained a major 
consideration for local governments when deciding policies regarding the STR market. Similar 
to the special interest groups, two sides also exist when thinking about the public interest. 
Increased tourism and tax revenues provide significant economic benefits to cities—and their 
citizens (FTC, 2015). A strong argument that STRs promote the public interest can be made due 
to this boost in local economies. Also, 48 percent of income hosts that use Airbnb claim that the 
supplemental revenue from listing their home as a STR helps pay for rent and food. In addition, 
53 percent of hosts admit that this income has helped them keep their house (FTC, 2015). Due to 
the revenue opportunities for hosts, policymakers consider public interest and the advantages that 
come with the STR market.  
Although the STR market can provide meaningful additional revenue through increased 
tourism and taxes in addition to income opportunities for hosts, local governments consider 
public interest in regulation because STRs “can also disrupt the market for affordable housing 
and create serious consumer safety hazards” (Katz, 2015, p. 1084). Local governments examine 
public interest in policy-decisions related to short-term rentals because of the significant impact 
the market can have on consumers, producers, and the city’s environment through externalities. 
Safety is a top priority for all local governments, so public interest has played a large role in 
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attempting to ensure that proper regulations exist to provide a safe environment for all parties 
involved. Therefore, public interest promoting further regulation exists when policymakers try to 
correct externalities related to short-term rentals. 
Local policymakers face the challenge of looking at both special interest groups and 
public interest. Since each city is different, there is not a uniform answer as to what cities should 
consider more when considering regulations. Public interest should always remain at the 
forefront of policymakers' decisions; however, this does not always happen because of special 
interest groups’ influence in the decision-making process. The power of both special interest 
groups and public interest associated with the STR market helps explain the variation in 
regulations in cities across the country. 
There are many benefits and costs associated with the short-term rental market. While 
opportunities exist by affording consumers unique living experiences, prices often less expensive 
relative to hotels, and providing property owners with a supplemental source of revenue, 
negative costs exist such as “super hosts” owning a significant stake of the STR market, a rise in 
home prices, poor consumer behavior and disregard for their surrounding environment, and 
gentrification. 
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III - R Street Institute: Roomscore Study Discussion 
 Although few in-depth studies regarding short-term rentals have occurred due to the 
recent significant growth in the market resulting in a lack of data, one primary study helped 
provide a baseline to expand upon. The R Street Institute, a nonprofit and nonpartisan 
organization that primarily studies public policy issues, published Ridescore, which observes 
problems associated with city and state regulation of the ride sharing market, in 2015. In March 
2016, the organization completed Roomscore, a similar study focused on short-term rental 
market regulations (Moylan, 2016). 
Roomscore examines how growth has led to many regulatory questions. Although room 
sharing has existed for many years, the introduction of the internet, specifically the mobile app 
market, has led to a much greater accessibility to information regarding room sharing, making 
the market significantly and rapidly grow. Homeowners can now post spare bedrooms and/or 
houses, described as “trapped capital,” within a matter of seconds, allowing for the short-term 
rental market to grow substantially. With this change in how people can rent housing came the 
emergence of several companies—particularly Airbnb—hoping to profit from it. As this market 
has grown and these groups have encouraged more people to rent out their idle rooms or 
residential properties, it has become increasingly complex, which encourages lawmakers to take 
new steps to regulate it. The rapid speed of growth in the industry has caused regulatory 
responses to lag behind, and now legislators have to catch up. 
 R Street examined legal and regulatory frameworks within 59 large cities throughout the 
United States to quantify the degree of friendliness towards short-term rentals in each city in a 
Roomscore index. The lack of availability of data proved a major hurdle for the study. 
Thoroughly investigating publicly available information, the researchers found themselves 
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unable to complete their study with only the data they had. To fill gaps from missing data and 
information, Moylan and his team of associates conducted interviews with relevant parties such 
as local regulators and lodging hosts.  
The final Roomscore index represent the degree of friendliness each city exhibits toward 
the short-term rental market. The maximum score is 100, and higher scores illustrate greater 
levels of friendliness. This overall score represents the aggregate of five sub scores, each of 
which serves as a distinct measure of friendliness (Table 1). Prior to any sub score point addition 
or deduction, each city began with a base score of 90. Tailored legal framework was the only 
possible positive increase to the base score, while the other four regulation categories acted as 
penalties to the overall friendliness for each city. 
Table 1 
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The tailored legal framework category was the first issue of interest used to build the 
index. This category measured the strength and clarity of existing legal foundations with respect 
to the short-term rental market. Cities could receive a maximum of 10 points in this category that 
were added to the base score of 90 (Table 2). Researchers began measuring this parameter by 
answering “how forward-looking the city is with regard to contemplating disruptive innovation 
in lodging” (Moylan, 2016, p. 6). New, updated legislation that specifically identifies and 
addresses room sharing represents strong tailored legal framework. Any city whose guidelines do 
not specifically discuss room sharing—including single rooms and whole homes—did not 
receive the full set of 10 positive points, and they experienced varying reductions in the sub 
score depending on the quality of the legal framework. Additionally, city adoption of strong 
frameworks signifies proactive legislative bodies that work to stay ahead of new and growing 
industries such as the STR market.  
Table 2 
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Overall, the legal framework data represented a delayed regulation adoption process that 
left many of the studied cities with poor scores in this category due to little to no stated policies 
regarding room sharing. R Street’s collected data found that only 21 cities had any framework 
recognizing the market and supplying a basis for short-term rentals to operate.  
Of the 21 cities that received any points in the category, 14 received the full 10-point 
credit. The wide range of scores across the 59 cities and the low average score of +2.9 could 
potentially demonstrate that further efforts need to take place regarding the clarity of legal 
frameworks for STR regulation across the majority of the country. 
 The second question pertains to legal restrictions. Moylan describes the purpose of this 
question as “seek[ing] to assess the restrictions cities place on the ability of property owners to 
engage in short-term rentals” (Moylan, 2016, p. 4). A significant amount of variability in 
responses to this question exists, for cities have vastly different restrictions on various elements, 
including geography, duration, zoning, and the proximity of the owner to the premises. Instead of 
the 10 points awarded in legal frameworks, the legal restrictions analysis could deduct up to 40 
points from the base score (according to the gravity of the regulations), with cities that have no 
restriction receiving no deduction at all (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
 
With 32 of the 59 cities including some form of restriction regarding the short-term rental 
market, the results regarding legal restrictions covered a wide range.  
Atlanta, Denver, and Oklahoma City completely ban any participation in the short-term 
rental market. Other cities with scores of -35 make it a severe challenge and limit participation in 
this market. Various cities with lower scores have more modest or no regulations. With an 
average score of -13.3, this category indicates wide variation in the regulation of short-term 
rentals. 
Taxation of the short-term rental market has become a major topic of discussion due to 
taxes imposed on hotels. The third question identified which party in STR transactions was 
tasked with collecting all applicable state and local taxes (if any exist). This category was a 
penalty on the overall friendliness Roomscore with a maximum deduction of five points from the 
base score. The two most prominent measures of this category were disproportionate taxes on 
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STRs relative to hotels and ill-fitting collection procedures based on the relevant business model. 
Ill-fitting tax collection captures a unique attribute of tax policies (Table 4). For example, free 
STR listing platforms such as Craigslist lack information on whether or not a rental transaction 
set up on the site actually occurred. In addition, if the transaction occurs, Craigslist never acts as 
a financial intermediary, and it would prove inefficient and illogical to task these 
platformscollecting all relevant taxes.collecting all relevant taxes.   
Table 4 
 
These sub scores reflect the judgement that nearly all cities set appropriate tax rates and 
collect from reasonable parties, or that nearly all cities do not collect any taxes on STRs. Only 
five of the 59 cities (Galveston, Oakland, Orlando, Portland, and San Francisco) were penalized 
for poor tax collection. Therefore, this parameter has little negative effect on the overall 
friendliness scores for 91.5 percent of cities. Moylan and his colleagues predict that as more 
cities impose STR-specific taxes in the future, policymakers will need improve collection 
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efficiency. Efficient practices will depend on the types of platforms operating in each city and 
existing hotel taxes.    
 The fourth question relates to licensing requirements and their impact on short-term 
rentals. This question measures potential hurdles associated with required registration and 
licensing for an individual to begin hosting in the STR market. Cities with long wait-times to 
receive licenses or approvals, large fees, or overall restrictive licensing requirements receive 
deductions up to 10 points in this category (Table 5). 
Table 5 
  
With an average point deduction of just -2.0, the data revealed that licensing did not play 
a large factor in the overall index scores. Although, 25 cities experienced some form of 
deduction, more than half of cities do not impose significant licensing hurdles. 
 Fort Lauderdale and Las Vegas experienced the maximum deduction amount (-10 points) 
due to their various restrictions to achieving a license in the short-term rental market. Fort 
Lauderdale, for example, requires property owners to “complete seven forms and pay more than 
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$2,900 in associated fees” over the course of five years (Moylan, 2016, p. 9). Other cities such as 
Washington require minimal costs and forms, so they earned deductions as low as –1. 
 The fifth and final question captures hostile enforcement of STRs that make continued 
operations in this market more challenging. Specifically, this category consists of “unnecessarily 
burdensome inspection regimes, disproportionately high insurance requirements, restrictive 
occupancy limits, mandates to provide vehicle parking spaces, and prescriptive regulation of a 
host’s location and/or accessibility” (Moylan, 2016, p. 5). Cities received deductions according 
to the challenges and severity of these hostile rules with a maximum deduction of 10 points from 
the base score. These restrictions create problems for the short-term rental market that the 
previous four questions could not capture (Table 6).  
Table 6 
 
Overall, 28 total cities received deductions because of their hostile outside rules, and the 
59 cities had an average score of -2.5. While nearly half of the cities received varying levels of 
deductions, the fairly low overall average demonstrated relatively mild hostile enforcement. 
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Anaheim, Fort Lauderdale, Las Vegas, Maui County, and San Francisco all received the 
maximum deduction of -10. Fort Lauderdale, for example, “limits occupancy, requires both 
initial and ongoing annual property inspections, enforces minimum parking requirements and 
mandates that an owner or manager reside within 25 miles of a rented property” (Moylan, 2016, 
p. 9).  
 After measuring each category and assigning the appropriate sub score to all five 
parameters for each city, these sub scores were added/subtracted from the base score of 90 to 
calculate each city’s Roomscore. The Roomscore denotes a city’s overall friendliness toward the 
short-term rental market based on the R Street index parameters. A higher (lower) score 
represents less (more) STR regulation. Letter grades were also assigned to overall Roomscores in 
order to help with grouping and increase result clarity (Appendix Figure 1). 
 The average score of 74.7, a C, involved the deduction of 15.3 total points. The standard 
deviation of 14.3 demonstrates that there exists a large variation in the scores of the cities. 
Therefore, 39 cities fall within a range of 60.4 and 89.0 (range of D- to B+). The vast differences 
in how each city approaches the regulation of the short-term rental market, as this figure 
displays, stem in part from the recency of the market’s growth.  
 The cities with the highest score of 97—Galveston and Savannah—have enacted no 
significant regulations against short-term rentals. Galveston, for instance, lost three points and 
gained ten only because it requires property managers to stay within a one-hour drive of the 
currently rented home and had a tax collection deduction.  
Eleven cities—Cleveland, Columbus, Dallas, Detroit, El Paso, Indianapolis, Mesa, 
Milwaukee, Omaha, Phoenix, and San Antonio, had a score of 90, the base score. These cities 
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had no regulations that aided or hindered the short-term rental market and thus neither received 
nor lost any points.  
Washington DC, as well as Charleston, Chicago, Las Vegas, and Maui, had a score close 
to the average for all of the cities studied. With no tailored legal framework, a limit on the 
number of bedrooms per rental, and a few other minor restrictions, Washington, with a score of 
74, has no laws in place to help protect people who wish to rent their property short-term and has 
minor restrictions that inconvenience property managers without prohibiting them from renting 
their rooms. 
The ten cities with scores lower than 59 (where < 60 equates to an F)—Atlanta, Denver, 
Fort Worth, Fresno, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, and 
Santa Barbara—either completely ban short-term rentals or make them virtually impossible for 
property managers (Table 7).  
Table 7 
  
The variations in restrictions on short-term rentals among different cities do not follow 
any easily explained trends according to the study completed by Moylan. Political leanings 
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among cities made no discernible difference in their scores. Additionally, tourism had little effect 
on the cities’ and states’ openness to short-term rentals. Jackson Hole had a score of 60 in 
comparison to Savannah’s score of 97. This lack of systematic influence in how cities regulate 
the short-term rental market provided a strong motivation for building regression equations to 
better understand and explain this variation. 
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IV – Model & Data 
 To fill gaps in existing research examining factors that explain differences in city-level 
short-term rental market regulatory decisions, we expanded R Street’s research to determine 
patterns between R Street’s calculated scores and measurable economic indicators. There is a 
current lack of understanding why some cities implement strict STR regulations and others allow 
unregulated operations (Moylan, 2016).  
Our empirical study consisted of six cross-sectional linear regression models with R 
Street’s overall friendliness scores and the five sub scores as dependent variables. Each estimated 
equation was designed to explain one of these scores. Additionally, all regressions included five 
explanatory variables: median household income, local sales tax rate, policy preferences, median 
age, and median value of owner-occupied homes. Assembled, our general form model follows: 
Scorei = β0 + β1 (T) + β2 (PP) + β3 (A) + β3 (I) - β4 (V) + ei 
 
Scorei: R Street Regulatory Score 
• Score1: Roomscore (Overall Friendliness Score) 
• Score2: Legal Framework 
• Score3: Hostile Enforcement 
• Score4: Tax Collection 
• Score5: Licensing Requirements 
• Score6: Legal Restrictions 
Explanatory Variables: 
• T: Local Sales Tax Rate 
• PP: Policy Preferences 
• A: Median Age 
• I: Median Household Income 
• V: Owner-Occupied Median Home Value 
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Our model used data from 35 of the same cities in R Street’s Roomscore study (Appendix 
Figure 2). In view of the short-term rental market’s recent popularity growth and subsequent 
passing of city regulations, we collected the most recent data on all explanatory variables. U.S. 
Decennial Census reports contain the most extensive economic data, but the STR market and 
regulatory policies have significantly changed since the last report from 2010. Although less 
extensive, 2018 Census estimates include recent changes in city-level economic indicators that 
may have influenced city regulations. These 2018 estimates limited our sample size to 35 cities 
instead of the 59 from R Street’s study because our indicators of interest were not yet estimated 
for every city. Additionally, the Census Bureau was transitioning its data to a new platform 
during our data collection, which limited access to the data set as it was updated. 
Local sales tax rates (T) target the same group of people that reserve STRs during out-of-
town trips because they often also choose to spend more money in restaurants and shop in local 
stores than residents of the respective city (The Tax Foundation, 2019). Cities with higher sales 
tax rates rely on these travelers for tax revenue, and STRs expand the supply of lodging 
accommodations and indirectly increase sales tax revenue (Airbnb, 2015). Therefore, we expect 
these cities to receive a higher overall friendliness score because such regulations would limit 
STR activity and consequently revenue from traveler spending. 
Policy preferences (PP) may show meaningful importance in a city’s decision of whether 
or not to regulate the short-term rental market (Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014). The overall 
policy preferences of a city represents the opinions of both voters and the policymakers that 
these voters selected as their representatives. The policy preferences variable has a ranking on a 
scale of -1 to +1. A score of -1 indicates the most liberal views, while a score of +1 describes the 
most conservative preference—with a score of 0 representing no policy preference. 
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Conservatives traditionally prefer less government intervention and less regulations; therefore, 
we predict that a higher policy preference score will indicate a higher overall friendliness score.  
Median age (A) can show the dynamic of a city’s STR supply (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2018). The average age of an Airbnb host is over 50 years old, and we expect a positive 
relationship between median age and less STR regulations (Muthara, 2018). Since the average 
age of a host is older than 50, then cities with a higher median age will likely include more 
Airbnb listings; therefore, public interest and special interest groups within the locality will more 
likely encourage less regulation because of their reliance on the STR market as a source of 
supplemental income. Therefore, we predict higher friendliness scores in cities with higher 
median ages. 
 Median household income (I) helps frame an understanding of residents’ potential 
spending behaviors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). The level of median income determines the 
effect that additional revenue from renting out extra living space has on households. Therefore, 
we anticipate cities with higher median incomes to have fewer households utilizing STR 
platforms to increase their incomes. In cities where fewer households list on sites like Airbnb, we 
predict higher overall friendliness scores. Voters and legislators in these cities are less likely to 
view the smaller number of STRs as a problem or a large source of tax revenue.   
 Median value of owner-occupied houses (V) provides information regarding the value of 
homes in a city (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). We expect that a higher value for houses may 
inspire full-time residents in a city to push policymakers to implement strict STR market 
regulations in order to maintain privacy and safety in their neighborhoods. We predict these 
cities will encourage policies that attempt to prevent negative externalities such as damage to 
homes and noise complaints, leading to lower STR friendliness scores.  
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V - Results and Discussion 
Our model results align with the variability Moylan (2016) observed across city-level 
short-term rental market regulation decisions. The six regressions show limited statistically 
significant estimated coefficients, reflecting relatively low explanatory power of the model. 
However, median household income, local sales tax rates, and policy preferences explain the 
most variation in our estimated equations.  
Table 8 
  
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of our variables. Examining this simple summary 
provides preliminary measures of variable behaviors. Adding and subtracting one standard 
deviation from the mean overall Roomscore index reveals that 68 percent of cities in our sample 
received overall friendliness scores between 60.74 and 89.82 out of 100 possible. Given that 
higher Roomscores indicate cities are friendlier toward STRs and impose less regulation, a range 
of 43 points and a mean of 75.29 indicates fairly large variation in the amount of regulation cities 
choose to impose on short-term rentals. Denver and Oklahoma City both earned the lowest score 
of 50. Louisville received the highest score of 93.  
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Based on the overall friendliness index calculation with a minimum earnable score equal 
to 25 and a maximum of 100, the lowest scores, rather than the highest, appear as the more 
extreme outliers. This illustrates that the most restrictive cities take more significant stances on 
STRs relative to the cities with the least regulations. It is also necessary to understand that this 
result may occur due to the index beginning with a base score of 90 points that puts upward 
pressure on the mean. Along with this, it is more difficult to implement regulations than to allow 
STRs to operate unregulated. This may capture the effect of local representatives choosing to 
regulate because they feel the need to take a strong stance in order to justify the governmental 
process. 
Also displayed in Table 8, the sub score descriptive statistics present significant 
variability across cities within the sample. Median household income has a range of $81,753, 
showing meaningful differences in income between some of the cities in our sample. This range 
offers insight into the different income levels across the model. Similarly, the median value of 
owner-occupied houses, adding and subtracting one standard deviation from the mean, exhibits 
that 68 percent of cities had home values between $592,197 and $68,723. The variability within 
one standard deviation of our data provides insight into the values of different houses potentially 
available in the STR market of a city.  
Sales tax indicates less variability between cities with a maximum of 5.41 percent, a 
minimum of 0 percent, and a mean of 2.03 percent. However, the contrast between a 5.41 
percent sales tax and a 0 percent sales taxes may affect policymakers' decision-making process 
regarding the STR rental market because of the different sales tax revenue potential across cities. 
The median age for the cities in our sample also shows less variability in comparison to the other 
sub score variables. The standard deviation reveals that 68 percent of the cities have median ages 
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between 36.6 and 32.9, which illustrates a small—although not negligible—variability in median 
ages across these cities. While unsurprising because people tend to move out of cities as they 
age, the median age of everyone living in the cities in our sample, three years younger than the 
United States median age, could explain why the median policy preference of -0.297 leans more 
liberal (U.S. Census, 2018). Younger individuals typically align with more liberal policies, with 
nearly 46 percent of 34 year-olds classifying themselves as Democrats or left-leaning; however, 
as people age, this percentage drops (Gallup, 2014).  
The correlations between legal framework and tax collection, licensing requirements, and 
hostile enforcement are -0.430, -0.434, and -0.555, all statistically significant. When cities 
strengthen their legal frameworks, these correlations signal that cities typically clarify their legal 
codes to enforce increased regulation rather than to promote the short-term rental market (Table 
9). 
Table 9 
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Turning from correlation to multiple regression analysis, we began by investigating the 
overall friendliness score. In reporting statistical significance, we adopted the following 
convention: "marginally statistically significant" for p-values between 0.05 and 0.10, 
"statistically significant" for p-values between 0.01 and 0.05, and "highly statistically 
significant" for p-values less than 0.01. 
Regression 1: (Table 10) & (Score1) 
Table 10 presents the estimated results from the regression with the overall friendliness 
index score (Score1) as the dependent variable. Higher (lower) overall scores represent less 
(more) regulations based on aggregating the five sub scores. This regression lacks statistical 
significance overall and in coefficient estimations, but it highlights the unpredictability of overall 
STR regulatory decisions across cities. Segmenting this friendliness index into the five sub 
scores and inputting them into our model as dependent variables resulted in stronger estimates 
and overall fit.  
Table 10 
 
Regression 2: (Table 11) & (Score2) 
Statistically significant variables (holding other things equal): 
   
 
 30 
• A 1 percent increase in sales tax rates for a city was associated with a 0.66 point 
decrease in the legal framework score 
• A 1-year increase in the median age was associated with a 0.71 point increase in 
the legal framework score 
• A $1,000 increase in median income was associated with a 0.26 increase in the 
legal framework score  
• A $10,000 increase in the owner-occupied median home value was associated 
with a 0.10 decrease in the legal framework score  
These regression results suggest that sales tax, median age, median income, and median 
value of owner-occupied houses affect the legal framework score calculated by R Street. These 
estimates indicate that cities with lower sales taxes, older populations, higher incomes, and lower 
owner-occupied housing prices tend to implement clearer laws regarding short-term rentals. The 
primary goal of higher sales taxes revolves around raising government revenue without having to 
increase involuntary taxes on city residents. Cities that experience high tourism activity generally 
have higher sales taxes because they increase tax revenue with few negative effects on the people 
living and working in these cities (Povich, 2015). Cities with high volumes of vacationers require 
hotels or other short-term living spaces for these visitors, and companies such as Airbnb offer 
alternatives to hotels. The estimated negative relationship between sales taxes and clearer short-
term rental legal framework confirms our hypothesis. Additionally, this provides additional 
evidence that cities with high tourism rates choose not to pass laws that explicitly target STR 
market activity because these would reduce tourism and consequently tax revenue. 
Higher owner-occupied home values, on the other hand, have a clearer association with 
strong legal frameworks. Legislators concern themselves with both maintaining home 
affordability without stifling growth and mitigating possible negative externalities associated 
with the short-term rental market (Sheppard & Udell, 2018). These points of focus make setting 
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political agendas and designing policies more difficult, but our results in this section suggest that 
policymakers take firm stances on short-term rentals in cities with higher owner-occupied home 
prices. This indicates that these cities do not want to risk new rental platforms like Airbnb 
causing significant changes in home values if they did not update vague or outdated laws.  
Overall, our results explain what influences cities to pass updated laws pertaining to the 
short-term rental market, although we could not identify why some of our variables have 
significant influences on this measure.   
Table 11       
 
Regression 3: (Table 12) & (Score3)      
Statistically significant variables (holding other things equal): 
• An increase of 0.1 on the policy preference scale was associated with a 0.35 
increase in the hostile enforcement penalty  
• An increase of 1 year in the median age was associated with a 0.69 decrease in the 
hostile enforcement penalty  
These regression results suggest that policy preferences and median age affect R Street’s 
hostile enforcement score. City policy preferences and median age both had statistically 
significant relationships with rises in R Street’s hostile enforcement penalty. Political preferences 
explain the score variations across cities well compared to other variables in this regression. We 
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anticipated that more conservative cities would impose less strict policies, and this model 
strongly supports our prediction. However, median age had the opposite association than we 
expected. Although small, this model shows that as median ages rise, the score penalty for 
hostile enforcement increases.  
Table 12 
 
Regression 4: (Table 13) & (Score4) 
Statistically significant variables (holding other things equal): 
• A 1 percent increase in the sales tax rate was associated with a 0.22 point increase 
in the tax collection penalty  
• A-year increase in the median age was associated with a 0.19 decrease in the tax 
collection penalty  
These regression results suggest that sales tax and median age affect the tax collection 
score that R Street calculated. Hotels face specific lodging taxes, and many cities have imposed 
similar tax structures on short-term rental transactions. Hotel companies lobbying that Airbnb 
rentals should also pay the often-significant lodging taxes have largely driven the introduction of 
these policies (Moylan, 2016). 
We found that cities with higher local sales taxes and younger populations tend to pass 
legislation that applies either the full lodging tax or a similar tax to short-term rental transactions. 
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We expected high sales taxes to explain which cities invoke specific rental tax laws because both 
policies focus on tourists in order to raise government revenue. If a city charges high sales taxes, 
they also tend to charge an explicit short-term rental tax. A higher sales tax may incentivize 
cities to invoke regulatory decisions that will increase the tax collection penalty scores because 
of the potential for additional financial gains. 
Cities with younger populations have also passed more laws imposing taxes on these 
transactions. The cause of this relationship does not have as clear of an explanation, and we 
initially attributed the connection to younger individuals supporting more progressive policies; 
however, this theory would only make sense if the policy preferences variable also had a 
significant relationship (Gallup, 2014). Unfortunately, no statistically significant relationship 
exists between policy preference and the taxation of short-term rentals, and we lack additional 
evidence supporting an explanation.   
Table 13 
 
Regression 5: (Table 14) & (Score5) 
Statistically significant variables (holding other things equal): 
• A 0.1 increase on the policy preference scale was associated with a 0.32 increase 
in licensing requirement’s penalty  
   
 
 34 
 Table 14 presents the overall regression regarding licensing requirement score penalties, 
and it explained little variation across cities. However, one variable, city policy preferences, was 
statistically significant. Although this regression is weak, political preferences explain a similar 
amount of variation in this model to the hostile enforcement model. However, the estimated 
relationship in this model is less valuable because the overall regression was not statistically 
significant. 
Table 14 
 
Regression 6: (Table 15) & (Score6)     
Legal restrictions had no discernable relationship with any of our explanatory variables 
which indicates that the intensity of laws preventing hosts from participating in the STR market 
follow no definite trend across these cities. We found it odd that we were able to explain 
differences in the strength of legal frameworks; however, there is no clear explanation for legal 
restrictions. Although these scores indicate different portions of STR regulations, we would have 
anticipated cities with clear and updated frameworks to have implemented restrictions that were 
explained by the same variables. We attribute this lack of a relationship to the fact that cities do 
not have to impose strict restrictions when clarifying their frameworks. This may indicate that 
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cities overall do not clearly choose to either deregulate or further regulate the STR market when 
updating their legal frameworks.    
Table 15 
 
Regression 7: (Table 16) & (Score1) 
New Model: Score1 = β0 + β1 (Rshare) + ei 
Dependent variable: 
• Score1: R Street Overall Friendliness Score 
Explanatory variable: 
• Rshare: Overall Rideshare Score 
As previously mentioned, conducting the Roomscore analysis, R Street observed the 
emerging ridesharing market in its Ridescore study. This study observed three categories of 
vehicle transportation: taxis, limos, and transportation network companies (TNCs). TNCs 
represent companies such as Uber and Lyft that provide transportation for individuals by drivers 
that use their own vehicles. Ridescore combined these three subcategories in a very similar way 
to the Roomscore friendliness index in order to create a ride sharing friendliness score index for 
each city. This index describes each city’s friendliness toward these three modes of 
transportation. 
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Due to the recent significant growth in both the ridesharing and short-term rental market, 
we wanted to observe whether any regulatory correlations existed across these two markets. 
Fortunately, both R Street’s Roomscore and Ridescore had the same 35 cities used in our original 
regressions, so we could directly compare the results of the two studies. Table 16 represents 
regression results of the previously reported overall Roomscore index as the dependent variable 
and the overall Ridescore friendliness score as the explanatory variable. 
Interestingly, the regression provided results that were nowhere close to statistically 
significant. The model exhibited no statistically significant association between the two 
friendliness scores. This surprised us because it indicates that cities do not make similar 
regulation decisions regarding ride sharing and room sharing. The lack of correlation between 
regulation styles within common cities likely shows that cities do not view the two markets as 
requiring the same regulatory conditions. Due to this view, economists cannot use current 
regulations regarding either of the markets to predict a city’s potential future regulatory decisions 
in the other market. 
Table 16 
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VI – Limitations & Future Research 
Although R Street tried for consist judgement when creating the Roomscore index, the 
irregularity in the data they collected as well as their collection methods introduce subjectivity 
into their model. For example, both the responses to the questions that the researchers asked city 
regulators and city laws varied considerably in their language, and the final index scores may 
have included inaccuracies and potential biases. We understand that this type of index requires 
more subjective scoring measures due to the variability in city-level regulation; however, this 
may have caused our results to inaccurately explain variations in STR market regulation.   
Additionally, collecting market-specific data on STRs might improve our results and 
provide clearer explanations for the variations and effects of STR regulation. Although this type 
of data is not currently available, Airbnb’s potential upcoming initial public offering (IPO) will 
likely release this data of interest. As a private company, Airbnb does not have to make most 
company data publicly available—which will become a requirement after its IPO. Limited data 
regarding how Airbnb’s revenue changes across states along with the impacts STRs have on city 
revenues and costs poses obstacles for cities when deciding what degree of regulation to 
implement. Specifically, cities cannot accurately anticipate the financial impacts certain 
regulatory laws will have on their overall economies or specific businesses. If Airbnb goes 
public, the variability in city STR regulation may decrease as cities better understand the 
financials behind one of the largest companies in the sharing economy.  
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VII - Conclusion 
 This thesis researched and observed the costs, benefits, and positive and negative 
externalities of the short-term rental market as well as regulatory implications/trends among 
many cities. Many current discussions surround this topic, making it relevant especially given 
the recent significant growth of the short-term rental market. Our analysis of the costs and 
benefits of STRs led to the conclusion that both advantages and disadvantages are prevalent; 
therefore, effective and appropriate regulations should exist to maximize the advantages and 
minimize the disadvantages of the STR market.  
In addition to an analysis of the market, we built upon R Street’s Roomscore study 
through our own statistical analyses and found difficulties in explaining variability in city-level 
short-term rental market regulations. Although our results indicate that there are few 
commonalities between cities and the way they regulate STRs overall, breaking down the 
Roomscore index into its sub scores revealed interesting relationships. We were able to explain 
variations in legal frameworks reasonably well with local sales tax rates, median ages, median 
age, and owner-occupied home values. Additionally, hostile enforcement across cities are best 
explained by residents’ political affiliations and median age. These results suggest that variations 
in the overall Roomscore index and even the sub scores do not follow the same pattern across 
across the 35 cities in our sample.  
The relevance and large-scale predicted growth of the short-term rental market leads to 
the importance of future research regarding this topic—especially as time goes on and more data 
becomes accessible. We anticipate Airbnb’s upcoming IPO to provide supplementary data 
necessary for additional informative studies.  
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